道拉吉里山难录

驴兄辛苦了！

这个事件组织方现在有没有个正式的说法？

辛苦了

俺猫咪去看看。。。。

而某队员为第3-4次登雪山，攀登技术基础和体力都很薄。
---是不是都很棒？

那里不能发帖，先写到这里

辛苦了,帖子的直接联结如下:

http://bbs.rockbeer.org/viewthread.php?tid=1241669053

辛苦，谢谢！

这个没听说过

看看

我把好评献给你！

看了毛驴整理的全过程，我有几个感受：

1、组队时，对于这座山峰的选择，有盲目自信的成分，特别是对高山天气的预估，对于线路难度则似乎没有预估。
2、夏尔巴与客户之间，没有建立起码的“向导-客户”的关系。
3、整个攀登过程中，没有在关键位置设立有效的人员接应。比如，C3营地和路线剩末端。
4、非常不重视队内通讯。2名队长+6名队员，竟然只有3台对讲机。13日当晚，攀登队长张伟和夏尔巴队长达瓦回到C3之后，竟然没有想过用对讲机与山上取得联系。可见组织者对于通讯手段重要性的严重忽视。
5、组织方没有兑现夏尔巴与客户之间“1比1”的比例承诺，导致下撤时各自为战的局面下，部分客户身边没有向导。
6、张伟没有缴费，但下撤时却带走了夏尔巴；张伟是“攀登队长”，但队伍出现危难的时候，却只知道自己撤回C3“睡大觉”。那么，张伟参加这个队伍，到底是来干嘛的？大明玛若如张梁等所言，也是“蹭”登山的话，这个队伍的人员配备，实在乱得可以。出事的隐患，早已预先埋下了。
7、杨春风、张伟在下撤时的表现，只能用“自顾逃生”来形容——他们俩都带走了一名本应属于客户的夏尔巴。那么，队长和攀登队长的职责何在呢？
8、中方客户与夏尔巴之间语言沟通的水平不足。
9、全程没有看到使用GPS的描述，说明从组织方、到夏尔巴、到客户，都缺乏对未知山峰的重视，也缺乏对登山基本工具的掌握。
10、登顶后的天气变化，虽然有，但也并非致命的。
11、山难，是一系列组织不足、指挥适当、服务不到位、能力欠缺、心理素质参差等因素综合促成的。于是在天气小有变化之后，攀登队长（竟然）第一次滑坠，启动了整个队伍的崩溃，然后是组织方2人放弃客户自保、杨/张/达瓦3名队长在自身安全后漠视山上遇险的客户……最终造成3人遇难。

商业登山，也有其必须遵从的规则，道拉吉里峰山难，是一次典型的、达不到基本标准的、失败的“商业登山”个案。后来者，不论是组织者还是客户，都应从中吸取教训。

6、张伟没有缴费，但下撤时却带走了夏尔巴；张伟是“攀登队长”，但队伍出现危难的时候，却只知道自己撤回C3“睡大觉”。那么，张伟参加这个队伍，到底是来干嘛的？大明玛若如张梁等所言，也是“蹭”登山的话，这个队伍的人员配备，实在乱得可以。出事的隐患，早已预先埋下了。
7 杨春风、张伟在下撤时的表现，只能用“自顾逃生”来形容——他们俩都带走了一名本应属于客户的夏尔巴。那么，队长和攀登队长的职责何在呢？

----问得好！

能把这么乱的材料整理在一起， 毛驴很不容易

Dhaulagiri, May 16 2010

On May 16 the Himalayan air rescue team ¨C a cooperation of epalese Fishtail Air and
Swiss Air Zermatt AG - rescued six climbers from Dhaulagiri in Nepal.

Around noon on May 14, the centre of engagement in Kathmandu called the crew and
informed them that the Chinese expedition on Dhaulagiri is in trouble at 7`500 meters.
The team finished the evacuation of a Mexican climber on Everest base camp and flew to
Kathmandu the same evening.

Very early on Saturday morning, around 5 a.m. May 15, the crew received the rescue call
and departed shortly later with the rescue helicopter (AS350 B3) from Kathmandu Airport in
direction Dhaulagiri. Arriving on scene, the rescuers found out that from the 8 Chinese
climbers and 6 Sherpa!ˉs, 13 expedition members wer still on the mountain, trapped in camp
3 at 7`300 meters ore even higher, exhausted and one of them most likely dead. Only one
Chinese climber could descend to base camp and alert the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu.

As there was no radio communication to the team on the mountain and winds blowing up to
40kts, the rescue team decided to fly up and have a look. At 7`000 meters Bruno, Sabin and
Gerold could approach 2 climbers on their way down to camp 2 as near as 50 meters. There
was no sign of climbers on camp 3 in front of the tents.
During the second reconnaissance flight 1hour later more climbers were spotted. They seemed
to be exhausted and descending extremely slowly in direction of camp 2. Unfortunately the
weather was changing and the conditions became too bad for an air rescue attempt. The
mission had to be stopped and delayed for the next day.

The frontal system brought some more fresh snow and early the next morning, May 16 , two
helicopters departed from Pokhara to base camp Dhaulagiri. The Swiss expedition informed
the rescue team, that during the night, 2 Sherpa's could descend to base camp. The rest of the
Chinese expedition was able to climb down to camp 2, leaving a total of 11 people on the
mountain. The Chinese embassy had information, that one member of the expedition died in
camp 3. They wanted to send 4 Sherpa!ˉs up to recovr the body. The plan was to fly 4
Sherpa!ˉs, Bruno and Purna to Col Ne at 6`000 meter and sling the Sherpa!ˉs one by one up to
camp 2 at 6`800 meters with the assistance of Bruno.

During the approach to Col Ne the rescuers spotted 2 people climbing down, just below camp
1. They were able to descend on their own. Between Col Ne and camp 1 at around 5`900
meters one climber was waiving for help. He was evacuated by the helicopter hovering short
above the ground. 300 meters above Col Ne (6`400 meter) 2 other climbers were evacuated
by the hovering helicopter. They were so much exhausted that they hardly could enter the
partially landed helicopter.

Further up, just below camp 2, a rescuer (Bruno) had to be dropped near a group of 3
climbers, by sling operation. One of them was not able to walk anymore. These climbers were

evacuated by sling operation and brought down to Col Ne, whereupon they were flown to
base camp.

To rescue the climbers still higher up the mountain (3 climbers were still missing somewhere
around camp 3) the idea was to bring well acclimatized Sherpa!ˉs up to camp 2 by sling
operations.

Short after the first Sherpa was flown to camp 2, the rescue team heard over the radio from
base camp that nobody was in camp 3 any longer. Two Chinese mountaineers presumably lost
their way in a whiteout and felled down. One climber died at around 8000 meter after
suffering a high altitude oedema. The rescue mission was thereupon aborted.

The five wounded Chinese mountaineers were flown to hospitals in Pokhara and Kathmandu.
Some of the Sherpa!ˉs suffered light frostbites butcould be treated in base camp. The rescue
mission was carried out by both the Nepalese and Swiss crew.

有心救援,
即时是在那样的环境, 那样的装备下,
还是可以有更好的结果.
事实上那天晚上的天气是非常好的,
否则山上2位队员不可能安全返回.

这完全是一场灾难.

不是天灾，是人祸！

文中提到：据杨春风口述回忆，“当时李的行动、呼吸、交谈正常”。此时，他查看了李斌的氧气正常，以及李斌的行动、呼吸正常，和他交谈了解也正常，此时时间较早，因此未作让李斌下的决定。其他队员亦正常。

——据传：李在登顶的过程中，曾自己提出来过下撤，因为他说自己有恐高症，但当时没有人理会。根据这段描述看来，杨一定是有听到李的话，并且对李的下撤要求做过考虑的。——由此引出问题：李既然自己要求过下撤，领队为什么没有同意或者强制他下撤？是否和未达到配比的夏尔巴人数有关？？？

另文中：韩大声喊‘老杨、老杨…’，后面的人跟不上前面了。但杨春风无回应，后来韩昕改口喊‘杨春风’，那时李斌躺下了，杨春风没用氧气、他那里还有大半罐。喊他也不理，不知是高反还是其他原因。”

张梁、韩昕曾喊杨春风（他有余氧气），但无回应，楼和边巴于是放弃李斌，。“此时，杨不知是高反还是其他原因，喊他也不理，只顾往下跑了！因当时机长在后面感觉不行了！”

一个疑问?

为什么韩昕不和张梁一起下撤?

混乱的组织比高山上的天气更可怕。。。。。

先声明,本人不是个专业的户外人士,更没爬过雪山. 看了毛驴的记录,并且还到了另外的报道(6月份一期三联和深圳电视的这次山难的专题)
基本大家都在探讨组织者的种种问题,如缺乏经验,管理不当,决策不对等等. 可是人的生命最终负责的还是自己,不能一味的托付给"向导和组织者".有几个为什么---

1. 深圳电视的报道说,有一人提前退出,因为感觉对组织者的不信任. 为什么那个人可以感觉到问题,其他人一点都没有感觉呢?还是有感觉,但是觉得还是要坚持登山.

2. 深圳电视的报道有提到, 登顶和下山那几天的天气不适合(有风雪). 中间其实也有机会放弃冲顶, 澳大利亚那俩更专业的人士做了不冲顶的决定. 为什么我们队员自己不去思考呢,难道组织者说去登顶就去了? 这个时候还是有机会退出队伍的,为什么没有队员退出, 为什么不对自己更负责些? 我记得电视里说,因为13号是该山被征服的纪念日,我们中国队员觉得"有意义"而坚持冲顶.(如若如此,很荒谬) ,又是再次对自己的生命不负责.

3.组织者不专业,能力有问题. 队员自己更不专业,能力也更有问题. 稍微不要冲昏头脑,自己多做下功课 多查资料,就可以判断出该山的风险很大, 更何况很多风险隐患一早都已经表露, 那个时候自己还是可以掌握自己的命运的,可以选择退出. 可以及时的质疑领队.可是没有一个队员退出~~~ 为什么? 是不是队员自己太自信也太不专业了, 而这又表明我们对自己的生命有多么的不负责, 就如此的全权托付了出去~~

大家各自逃命没有错. 在那个可怕情况下,只有各自逃命,那是人的本能. 不该去指责"各自逃命"的人,包括向导,领队,队长~~~ 逃命成功的人还是很迅速的组织了救援,并没有不顾队员生死~~

如果队员有那么强的判断分析能力，估计就不参加商业队，直接Solo道峰了。。。

BTW，澳大利亚那两个是无氧攀登的